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■CHINA’S rapid economic growth over the past two decades has made it one of the 
world’s largest economies and an export 
powerhouse that has caused alarm from Asia 
to Europe to the US.  The reason for this alarm 
is simple: by rapidly turning economic 
success into political clout,  China is poised to 
become a 21st-century superpower.
A large part of China’s development is 
being predicated on science and technology. 
Last year, its 15-year “Medium to Long-term 
Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology”, or MLP, called for 60 per cent of 
economic growth to be based on science and 
technology by 2020. To get there, investment 
in research and development must grow to 
900 billion yuan ($115 billion), boosting the 
proportion of GDP spent on research from 
today’s 1.3 per cent to 2.5 per cent. What’s 
more,  the MLP calls for the country’s reliance 
on foreign technology to fall from more than 
50 per cent to below 30 per cent by 2020. 
China is already no slouch at science: with 
more than a million scientists and engineers 
devoted to research and development, it ranks 
second only to the US – and is about to 
overtake it in the number of doctoral degrees 
in science and engineering the country 
confers. When it comes to international 
publications China ranks fifth, above France, 
Italy and Canada.
Even so, this next great leap forward has its 
sceptics. Despite its remarkable economic 
development so far, and the nationalistic 
pride many Chinese take in it, the ability of 
China to sustain its growth is increasingly 
being questioned in Chinese policy circles and 
by foreign observers who take the trouble to 
look beneath the surface.
Will Hutton is one such. In The Writing on 
the Wall,  Hutton, head of the UK think tank 
the Work Foundation and author of the 
bestselling The State We’re In, gives us the 
political economist’s take. And while he by no 
means gives science and technology centre 
stage, he does have an important argument to 
make about China’s relation to them.
Hutton reviews some of the best thinking 
about China’s superpower ambitions and 
capabilities, and concludes, with the sceptics, 
that the problems looming are so great that 
only profound institutional change will spare 
China a series of debilitating economic, 
environmental, social and political crises. He 
doesn’t stop there, though, Hutton also seeks 
to understand an emerging China in the 
context of a western world facing its own 
challenges of lost institutional effectiveness 
and incoherent values.
This is a very ambitious agenda, and, in 
spite of his often keen insights, Hutton’s 
success is mixed. The organisation of the book 
itself is a bit odd. The first half is devoted to 
China, the second to the US (plus a few passing 
references to the UK), with ruminations on 
political philosophy sandwiched in between.
In the China half, Hutton takes us on a 
quick tour through 3000 years of Chinese 
history, highlighting big questions such as 
why did the west modernise and not China? 
He introduces us to the achievements and 
debacles of Chinese socialism after 1949, and 
reviews the accomplishments and continuing 
dilemmas of the post-1978 reform era.
Then the focus of the book changes to an 
exploration of the strengths of western 
society and how many of these are now being 
lost. The message is that the west has nothing 
to fear from China if it can rediscover the 
sources of its own cultural and institutional 
vitality, and help China emulate them. Hutton 
looks to the legacy of the Enlightenment to 
find the threads which will bind together the 
two very different parts of the book. In brief, 
the west experienced the Enlightenment and 
China didn’t; the west is squandering its 
Enlightenment heritage; China needs to 
discover the essence of the Enlightenment 
and adapt it to Chinese realities.
For this argument to be convincing, 
though, we need a somewhat fuller and more 
systematic explication of what Hutton means 
by the Enlightenment. He says nothing, for 
example, about a large body of scholarship 
that draws attention to the dark side of the 
Enlightenment legacy , such as  the 
development of an impersonal, mass society,  
the industrialisation of war,  and 
environmental degradation. 
Instead, he sees the Enlightenment as 
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having left the west a unique legacy of “public 
space” between the private concerns of 
individuals and those of the state. In this 
space, “reason” as a public or collective 
resource becomes established, norms of 
tolerance take root in the face of conflicting 
interests, and standards of transparency and 
accountability for the state and others acting 
in the public space, are established. 
Hutton is especially interested in the 
modern, post-Enlightenment corporation, 
which embodies the “moral dimensions of 
capitalism”.  By balancing market discipline 
with community and social trust, he believes  
corporations helped create the ecosystem that 
has sustained the west’s record of 
technological innovation.
According to Hutton, China’s chances of 
finding sustainable development depend on 
adopting these Enlightenment-inspired 
values and institutions: checks and balances 
in public life, transparency and accountability 
in the justification of state action, free trade 
unions and professional associations, and the 
building of modern companies to replace 
dysfunctional socialist enterprises. Without 
such changes – all largely absent in the 
Chinese tradition – China will persist in what 
Hutton calls “Leninist corporatism” and its 
future will remain at risk.
For Hutton, China’s weak record of 
innovation over the past 25 years is 
compelling evidence that it cannot be changed 
without embracing Enlightenment values. 
Within China, however, the interest in 
becoming an “innovation-oriented society” by 
2020, the ambitious MLP, and a set of policies 
for institutional reform reflect a strong belief 
in the progress made in science and 
technology over the past 20 years, and in a 
promising future.
One of the challenges for China-watchers is 
to work out what is meant by this rather 
remarkable faith in science, a faith which 
some might construe as being Enlightenment-
inspired. Critics of the Enlightenment might 
see it as merely as a warmed-over version of a 
misguided and now discredited tradition of 
socialist technocracy which, with its belief in 
the “rationalisation” of society, is as much a 
part of the Enlightenment legacy as the 
virtues identified by Hutton.
On the other hand, could the new push for 
scientific and technological development in 
China be a reflection of 21st-century cultural 
and institutional evolution that has its own 
logic? Not that of the western Enlightenment, 
but within a Chinese context and an 
alternative developmental path more suitable 
to the realities of globalisation.
Before visiting China, Hutton claims to 
have considered this possibility, but now 
firmly rejects it. In doing so, however, he is not 
entirely convincing. Hutton’s grasp of China’s 
20th-century struggles with modernity does 
not extend to the complexities of why the 
western values and institutions he celebrates 
have not taken root. He leaves unexamined 
the fact that at various times over the past 
hundred years, Chinese intellectuals have 
indeed tried to build a “Chinese 
Enlightenment” by promoting science and 
democracy, and why, while progress on the 
science side is in evidence, democratisation 
has remained elusive.
Hutton, along with a number of liberal 
Chinese intellectuals, may be right – and I 
think they are – in believing that China’s quest 
to become an “innovation-oriented society” 
through scientific and technological 
development can only be realised by 
embracing democratic values and practices. 
But for the Enlightenment argument to be 
truly convincing , we need a better account of 
why China has resisted these values for so 
long, and why we should not entertain the 
possibility that China will find an alternative 
trajectory rooted in its own rich history of 
philosophical ideas, experience in governance 
and technological achievements.
And, in keeping with Hutton’s ambitions, 
we would also need a fuller account of why a 
successful Chinese model for development in 
the 21st century might not serve as an 
inspiration for a west which has lost its way.  l
Richard P. Suttmeier is professor of political science at 
the University of Oregon in Eugene
Could China end up inspiring the west with a successful 
home-grown model of sustainable development?
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